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ABSTRACT
Abstract: Most philosophers addressing the issue of meaning in life 
seem to think that non-human animals cannot have a meaningful 
life because only humans have what it takes to do so. In this paper, 
I discuss three prominent philosophical theories of meaning in life, 
all of which implicitly or explicitly deny non-human animals the pos-
sibility of living a meaningful life. I will argue that none of them is 
convincing and that we should embrace a more comprehensive and 
inclusive understanding of meaning in life that allows for non-human 
lives to be meaningful and, in their own right, worth living.
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This one is for Lottie
“If there is no God,” William Lane Craig once remarked 
(Craig 1994, 45), “then our life is not qualitatively different 
from that of a dog,” by which he meant to say that it would 
be completely meaningless and have no value whatsoever. 
Whether Craig is right about God is a question I am not going 
to discuss here. Instead, what I shall focus on is whether he is 
right about dogs. 
Clearly, Craig’s dog is a proxy for all non-human animals. 
There can be little doubt that non-human animals are capable 
of having good lives, just as much as humans are, although 
what makes life good for them may be different from what 
makes life good for us (Hauskeller 2018). However, can they 
also have meaningful lives? Most philosophers addressing the 
issue of meaning in life seem to think that they cannot and 
that only humans have what it takes to live a meaningful life 
(two recent exceptions are Purves & Delon (2018) and Thomas 
(2018)). Accordingly, the life of people who are believed to live 
a meaningless life is frequently compared to the life of animals: 
it is, supposedly, repetitive, without sense of time, not creative, 
not aspiring to anything higher, unreflected, dedicated to the 
pursuit of the lower pleasures, and revolving around the most 
basic (or basest) interests. For many philosophers writing about 
meaning in life, the life of non-human animals, or more pre-
cisely what we imagine such an animal’s life to be like, is the 
perfect foil to the meaningful life that humans are expected to 
aspire to. Thus Thaddeus Metz claims that we find meaning in 
life precisely by transcending our animal nature and connect-
ing to goods that lie beyond what we share with other, “lower” 
animals. What we share is being alive, having a healthy body, 
exercising one’s perceptual capacities, and experiencing plea-
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sure, none of which is fit “to make one’s existence significant.” 
A meaningful life is one that “merits great esteem or admi-
ration” because of that life’s bearer’s “sophisticated contour-
ing” of their “rational faculties toward fundamental conditions 
of human life,” which is not possible for non-human, and that 
means essentially non-rational, animals (Metz 2013, 29). 
In the following, I shall look into the assumption that is 
tacitly being made here: that the life of a non-human animal 
cannot be meaningful; I will discuss some of the justifications 
given for it, its apparent implications, and its plausibility. 
What do we mean when we talk about meaning?
So what exactly are we talking about when we talk about 
meaning in this context? On the face of it, lives, be they human 
or non-human, do not seem to be the kind of things that can 
have meaning. Only things that are about other things can have 
meaning. This sentence, for instance, has a meaning. When 
I say “this sentence has a meaning,” what I mean is that the 
sentence “this sentence has a meaning” has a meaning. The 
meaning of the sentence “this sentence has a meaning” is that 
the sentence “this sentence has a meaning” has a meaning. My 
life, on the other hand, has no meaning, or if it does, its mean-
ing appears to be different from that of a sentence. A sentence 
has a meaning because it says something, and because it does it 
can be read and understood and should be read and understood 
in a certain way. My life does not say anything, it just is, which 
is why it should not be read and understood in a certain way. 
Indeed, it cannot be read and understood at all (even though I 
may feel tempted to do so anyway). In that sense at least, sen-
tences can have meaning, while lives cannot. 
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Yet it is also clear that, for us, lives can very well be mean-
ingful or meaningless, or more or less so. We know this be-
cause we feel it, or more precisely because we feel something 
that we try to capture with the word “meaning.” Before all else, 
what we call meaning in life is an experiential reality, and we 
are most keenly aware of that reality when it is absent: when 
our own life, or that of somebody else, appears to be devoid of 
meaning. That experiential reality can be expressed in differ-
ent ways. A life that appears “meaningless” is a life that is lived 
without conviction, in which the things we do seem to have no 
point. It is a pointless life that, we feel, makes no difference, 
that is inconsequential, a life that does not matter or matters so 
little that it could just as well not be lived, just as a meaningless 
sentence is one that could just as well not be said or written. It 
is an empty, purposeless life, one that is felt to provide us with 
no good reason to live it, a life that appears, ultimately and all 
things considered, not worth living. (Philosophers like to make 
distinctions, and they are right to do so. However, our actual 
experience does only rarely adhere to the neat distinctions we 
make. Here, distinctions are often blurred. Thus, although it 
may well be possible to distinguish sharply between the point-
less, the indifferent, the inconsequential, the purposeless, the 
meaningless, and the not-worth-living, in reality they often 
blend into each other.)
If a life is felt, by the one who lives it, to be meaningless 
in that comprehensive sense, their life can reasonably be ex-
pected to not only be meaningless (to them), but also unhappy. 
It would be difficult to understand somebody who told us that 
they find their life not worth living, but that they are nonethe-
less very happy. That they find their life not worth living is an 
expression of their unhappiness or the particular form it as-
sumes. In other words, at least part of what they mean when 
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they say that they feel their life is not worth living is that they 
are unhappy with the way their life is going. We can of course 
be unhappy for other reasons than that we find our life mean-
ingless. We can for instance be unhappy because we are poor 
and find it difficult to make ends meet, or because we are ill 
and hurting, or because we face problems in our life that we do 
not know how to overcome. But we can also be unhappy, and 
indeed profoundly unhappy, despite being healthy, not having 
to worry about money, and having no real problems in life, for 
the sole reason that we do not see a point in living, or at any 
rate in our way of living. Sometimes we are unhappy because 
we encounter obstacles on our chosen life path, and sometimes 
we are unhappy because we feel that there is something wrong 
with the life path that we have chosen (or that has been cho-
sen for us). And there are indeed lives or ways of living one’s 
life that strike us as not particularly meaningful, for instance 
when we spend most of our life doing things that we do not 
really care about just to make enough money to survive and 
to be able to continue doing those things, or when we spend 
our life doing things that we believe we do care about, but that 
seem to be not really worth caring about, like collecting bottle 
caps or watching trains and writing down the numbers of the 
engines. Yet then again, even if we spend our lives in pursuit of 
something that is commonly regarded as meaningful, such as 
helping other people, or creating great art, or making scientific 
discoveries that allow humanity to advance in some way, or 
any of the other things that are commonly associated with the 
idea of a “meaningful life,” we can still reach a point where we 
wonder what, ultimately, all this is good for. Sometimes, even 
the things that are generally agreed to have a point can appear 
quite pointless to us. 
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So where does this leave us? We have seen, or so I have ar-
gued, that the question of meaning in life arises mostly when 
said meaning is felt to be missing, and when it is felt to be 
missing, we are unhappy. A life felt to be meaningless is an 
unhappy life, although not every unhappy life must also be felt 
to be meaningless, since sometimes we are unhappy for other 
reasons than a perceived lack of meaning. However, what we 
have not ruled out yet is the possibility that someone may lead 
a happy, but meaningless life, which would only be an option 
if we can mistakenly feel that our life is meaningful, while in 
fact it is not. That this is possible is suggested by (usually imag-
ined and therefore not very reliable) cases where a person is 
extremely happy doing something that most of us (those of us 
with more lofty ambitions) find utterly trivial and insignificant. 
It is difficult to see a life as worth living that is, for instance, 
spent mostly watching daytime soaps requiring a minimum 
of higher brain activity, even if enjoyed thoroughly. But then 
again, it is also difficult to imagine a person with normal hu-
man capacities actually being happy doing this and not much 
else in their life. If we actually found somebody who appeared 
completely happy watching soaps all day, every day, we could 
not but wonder how this was possible: how anyone can be hap-
py living their life like that. Yet if they really are happy, then 
we should expect that they also see some point in what they are 
doing, and if they do not, then they are unlikely to be happy. 
Just like we cannot be truly happy if we think that our life is 
pointless and not really worth living, we cannot think of our life 
as pointless and not worth living if we are happy. A happy life 
is always meaningful for the one who lives it. Only if we look 
at it from the outside and privilege the third-person perspective 
over the first-person perspective can we doubt that what ap-
pears to be meaningful to someone really is meaningful. That 
happens when we fail to see the point in what they appear to 
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see a point in doing. While they may find their life worth liv-
ing, we do not. We feel and think that we would not want to live 
our life like that and perhaps also that people should not live 
their life like that.
Susan Wolf’s Fitting-Fulfilment Theory of 
Meaning
It is this intuition that has led several philosophers, most no-
tably Susan Wolf, to surmise that happiness or subjective ful-
filment is not sufficient to make a life meaningful. Something 
else is needed, a connection to something that lies outside of 
us. If you love doing something that is not really worth doing 
or at any rate not really worth loving, Wolf has argued, then do-
ing it does not make your life meaningful. It may well be true 
that without love (for something that lies outside of ourselves), 
or more precisely the active engagement with something that 
we love, or that we love engaging with, our lives lack meaning, 
but Wolf insists that love is only necessary, but not sufficient. 
There are some things we do out of love that we should not re-
ally be doing at all. In those cases our love is misplaced. We 
love something that we should not love, see value in something 
that in fact does not have any value, or at any rate not as much 
value as we think it has. Meaningful is our loving engagement 
only if what we engage with deserves the love and attention that 
we bestow on it. Meaning, Wolf claims, “arises from loving ob-
jects worthy of love and engaging with them in a positive way” 
(2012, 8). Meaning in life is thus neither purely subjective nor 
purely objective. In order for there to be meaning in our lives, 
the subjective (love, appreciation, and the peculiar fulfilment 
that results from our active engagement with what we love) 
and the objective (that what we love is actually worthy of being 
loved) need to come together. Meaning “arises when subjective 
attraction meets objective attractiveness” (Wolf 2012, 9). Ful-
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filment, in Wolf’s terminology, is, although subjective, more 
than just pleasure. It is the specific kind of pleasure (or positive 
feeling) that arises from an engagement with what is taken to 
be objectively good. Wolf insists, however, that subjective ful-
filment is not enough. If Sisyphus were not frustrated, but on 
the contrary completely fulfilled by his never-ending task of 
pushing a boulder up a hill, if he thought that pushing a boulder 
up a hill is a really (objectively) good thing to do, a worthy end, 
then this would not suddenly make his life meaningful. What 
he is doing would still be pointless, simply because perpetually 
pushing a boulder up a hill for no good reason is not an objec-
tively worthy end. Fulfilment, according to Wolf, only makes 
our lives meaningful if it is a fitting fulfilment. 
The problem with this approach is, of course, that it is far 
from easy to say exactly which activities or “objects” merit our 
love and our being fulfilled by them, and which do not. Wolf 
suggests that the things that we are fittingly fulfilled by are 
things that offer us an opportunity to develop our powers, real-
ize our potential, or achieve excellence (2012, 36-37), but does 
not want to rule out that there may be others that do not meet 
those criteria and with which to engage is still fittingly fulfill-
ing. What she insists on, though, is that it is not enough for an 
object to give us pleasure. An activity can be very pleasurable 
to me, even very interesting, but may still be meaningless if 
what pleases or interests me is not of the kind that merits my 
attention. It would only merit my attention if its value exceeded 
the value that it has as an object of my pleasure or interest, or 
if its value had a different source than my pleasure or interest. 
We need to connect with and be concerned about a value that 
exists “outside of ourselves”, so that it can, in principle, also be 
accessed and appreciated by others. “A meaningful life is one 
that would not be considered pointless or gratuitous, even from 
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an impartial perspective” (Wolf 2012, 42). The trouble is, how-
ever, that a truly impartial perspective is nowhere to be found. 
All perspectives are necessarily partial. There is no view from 
nowhere. Instead, all views are from somewhere. Accordingly, 
even though it may seem to me that your life is pointless, the 
fact that my perspective on your life is not your perspective, 
i.e., not the perspective of the one who lives it, does not make 
my perspective impartial. And even if everybody else thought 
your life was meaningless, then this assessment would still 
not be impartial. It would simply be not your assessment, but 
somebody else’s. Yet despite acknowledging that it “is far from 
clear what a reasonably complete and defensible nonsubjective 
account (of value) will look like” (2012, 47), Wolf insists that 
we need to assume that certain things we do are objectively 
valuable to account for the fact that some lives do not strike us 
as meaningful even though they are lived in active engagement 
with an object of love (for instance, those of people who find 
subjective fulfilment in caring for a goldfish, which Wolf does 
not see as a fitting fulfilment). If our intuitions are to be trusted, 
then it seems that it is not sufficient to find something we love 
and then just do it: we also need to find the right, objectively 
worthy thing.
Should we trust this intuition? There are good reasons not 
to. For one thing, it is very much based on our own (consid-
ered, if you will) preferences in life or what we happen to think 
constitutes a worth-while life for us, and for another because 
we have no clear understanding of what makes a thing or an ac-
tivity objectively worthy. If there is something objective about 
our considered preferences, it is the potential to do some truly 
remarkable things that we know human beings have and that 
we often see unfulfilled in some (or indeed the majority of) 
humans. That may be regrettable, but it does not make the lives 
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of those who do not, or only partially, actualize this potential 
pointless and not worth living, and it most certainly does not 
make the lives of those pointless who never had that potential 
in the first place (such as non-human animals) or perhaps not 
even of those who have lost it (such as some dementia patients). 
We find our points where we can. If a human being who should 
know better lives like a dog, then we may have some (objec-
tive) grounds for judging their lives (comparatively) meaning-
less because that kind of life is not fitting for a human being 
given what a human being is capable of, but for a dog to live 
like a dog is perfectly fine. Indeed, what could be more fitting 
for a dog than to live like one? If the lives of non-human ani-
mals were indeed pointless and hence not really worth living, 
then this would seem to imply that the destruction of such a 
life would be a matter of little or no importance. This is the 
main reason why the issue merits scrutiny. A life that is not 
worth living is also a life that can be destroyed without loss. 
The death of a being whose life does not matter does not matter 
either. Thus, how we answer the question of whether non-hu-
man animals can have meaningful lives may have considerable 
practical consequences. 
Antti Kauppinen’s Teleological View of Meaning
Wolf contends that non-human animals cannot have mean-
ingful lives because they are incapable of loving things and ac-
tivities that are objectively worthy of love. According to Metz 
their lives are meaningless because they are incapable of tran-
scending their animal nature and thus have no access to higher 
goods. Neither is very convincing, mainly because of the un-
certain and rather dubious status of what are presumed to be 
objective or higher goods. However, there may be other reasons 
for concluding that non-human animals cannot live meaningful 
lives. Antti Kauppinen for instance suggests that in order to 
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be meaningful, what a life needs more than anything else is a 
good plot: it needs to be narratable (cf. Rosati 2013). 
Kauppinen understands meaning as one of two properties 
that makes a life good for the one who leads it, the other one 
being happiness (or pleasure). Both together constitute human 
well-being. Since happiness (pleasure) and meaningfulness 
are distinct properties, a life can be happy but meaningless, 
and also unhappy but meaningful. While happiness is the final 
good for passive subjects of experience, meaningfulness is the 
final good for active agents (Kauppinen 2012, 372). Since we 
are both, experiencers and agents, the best life for us is one that 
contains (a maximum of) both happiness and meaning. 
That the passive or experiential side of our being makes for 
one sort of good, while the active or agential side makes for 
another, is an interesting idea and certainly worth considering. 
It does not necessarily exclude non-human animals from living 
meaningful lives either. It all depends on whether non-human 
animals are thought to be agents, which in certain respects they 
certainly are, but apparently not in the respects that Kauppinen 
thinks are relevant in this context. It is less agency as such that 
in his view generates the orientation towards meaning as a final 
good, but rather the ability to look back and plan ahead, to per-
ceive one’s life as being stretched out in time, surpassing the 
needs and rewards of the present moment (which is an ability 
that most, if not all, non-human animals appear to lack). Mean-
ingfulness unfolds gradually over time and is thus, according 
to Kauppinen, ultimately a property of a life considered as a 
whole. Whether a moment or period in my life is meaningful 
or not depends not only on what is happening during that pe-
riod, but also on what happened before and what will happen 
later. In other words, my life now is, properly speaking, neither 
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meaningful nor meaningless. My life now may well contribute 
to the overall meaning of my life (which can be more or less 
meaningful), not because it is in itself meaningful, but because 
it helps create the narrative shape that makes (or perhaps bet-
ter: will have made) my life as a whole meaningful. Meaning 
is not additive, which means that a life’s (degree of) meaning-
fulness cannot be determined by adding up all the meaningful 
bits or periods in it and possibly subtracting all meaningless or 
“anti-meaningful” bits, as some have suggested (Metz 2013, 
64; Campbell and Nyholm 2015). 
So what exactly makes a life meaningful? Kauppinen lists 
a series of key features, which, when present in somebody’s 
life, makes it appropriate for them to feel a certain pride and 
joy, and appropriate for us to admire and feel inspired by them. 
Key features of a meaningful life are: that the goals pursued are 
objectively valuable (!), that pursuing those goals challenges 
the agent’s abilities, that nobody else can replace the agent in 
their pursuit, that the goals are pursued with some degree of 
success, that success is lasting rather than fleeting, and, per-
haps most importantly, that the agent’s life “forms a coher-
ent whole”, meaning that “past efforts increase the success of 
future goal-setting, goal-seeking, and goal-reaching” (2012, 
346). Because it is so much goal-focussed, Kauppinen calls 
this particular conception of meaningfulness teleological. This 
view is summed up in the formula “life is ideally meaning-
ful when challenging efforts lead to lasting successes” (2012, 
346). If good things happen to us, this is good, but it is even 
better (namely in terms of meaningfulness) if we had to work 
hard to make them happen, and the harder we had to work to 
get them, the better (more meaningful) our lives are. Further-
more, although getting what we want is good, it is even bet-
ter—and here Kauppinen echoes Wolf and Metz—if what we 
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want is good (i.e. worthy of being wanted), and the better what 
we want is, the better our lives are. It is even better still if what 
we get will last, and the longer it lasts the better our lives are. 
Kauppinen holds that meaningfulness is an objective quality of 
lives: “Just as a food can be unhealthy for a person even if she 
thinks it is healthy, a life can be meaningless for someone even 
if she thinks it is meaningful” (2012, 356). However, as far as 
I can see, Kauppinen does not attempt to provide an argument 
for this claim, the reason probably being that what is important 
for him is not this, but that we understand meaning in terms 
of narrative shape. “A meaningless life is one that is not going 
anywhere or moving forward” (2012, 357). 
If we accept Kauppinen’s account, then it would seem to fol-
low that non-human animals are not capable of living meaning-
ful lives: good lives perhaps (as in happy lives), but not mean-
ingful ones. Galen Strawson makes the point that “even dogs 
and horses can be the subject of excellent biographies” (Straw-
son 2008), and maybe they can, but it is difficult to imagine 
them writing their own autobiographies: not only because they 
cannot read and write, but because their “ability to look back 
and plan ahead” appears to be rather limited. All this goal-
setting, goal-seeking, and goal-reaching that Kauppinen finds 
so essential for a meaningful life is not exactly absent from the 
lives of cats and dogs and other non-human animals, but to the 
extent that it exists it is comparatively narrow in terms of time 
and scope. We don’t expect them to be making plans for their 
retirement or swapping stories about their youth. We could per-
haps provide a narrative of their lives with a decent plot, but it 
is doubtful that they could. And for most non-human animals it 
is probably true that their life is “not going anywhere or mov-
ing forward”. Yet why should it have to go somewhere at all? 
Why can it not stay what and where it is? It may be true that 
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non-human animals tend to live in the present moment and that 
the future or the past means little to them, but if living in the 
present is pointless and ultimately not worth living, why would 
an orientation towards the future and an existence that is more 
aware of its temporal extendedness make it more worth liv-
ing? After all, as Schopenhauer once pointed out, nobody ever 
lives in the future or the past. At the end of the day (and indeed 
throughout the day), we all, humans and non-humans alike, do 
the actual living of our lives exclusively in the present.
Richard Taylor’s Conscious-Creation View of 
Meaning
That it is our sense of temporal extendedness that provides 
the foundation for a life that is meaningful and worth living has 
also been argued by Richard Taylor in a remarkable reversal of 
the position he originally endorsed, which makes it particularly 
interesting in the present context. While in his seminal paper 
“The Meaning of Life” (Taylor 1970) he had argued that all that 
is required for a meaningful life (and “the nearest we may hope 
to get to heaven”) is that there is something in it that we pursue 
energetically, an “inner compulsion” to do whatever it is we do 
(which would allow us to regard as meaningful even the end-
lessly repetitive life of a blind worm in a cave and the endlessly 
repetitive life of a Sisyphus who desires nothing more than 
pushing boulders up hills), he later (Taylor 1987) renounced the 
claims he made previously, now arguing that even the life of a 
happy, passionately boulder-pushing Sisyphus (let alone that 
of a blind worm in a cave) is far from meaningful because it 
lacks one crucial ingredient: creativity. True creation, however, 
requires genuine newness, which is only possible if time is real.
Contrary to the countless philosophers, from Plato to Mc-
Taggart, who have claimed that time cannot possibly be real, 
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Taylor very sensibly insists that it feels far too real to be an il-
lusion. On the other hand, however, the reality of time is very 
much dependent on us. If there were no creatures like us, Tay-
lor suggests, time would not be (fully) real. Imagine a world 
entirely devoid of life. Such a world would have no “history or 
meaning” (Taylor 1987, 297). Time may exist in some abstract 
way, but it is completely irrelevant because it “makes no differ-
ence” what happens when. In that sense, time in such a world 
is not real yet. Now add living beings to this world (but still 
holding back on rational beings). According to Taylor, time 
has now been introduced to the world, but still only in a very 
rudimentary sense. Importantly, a world containing living but 
not rational beings would still be a world without history be-
cause nothing genuinely new ever happens in it. “The sun that 
rises one day illuminates nothing that was not there the day be-
fore, or a thousand or million days before. It is simply the same 
world, age after age. (…) Every sparrow is just like every other, 
does exactly the same things in the same way without innova-
tion, then to be imitated by every sparrow to follow. The robin 
or squirrel you see today does nothing different from those you 
saw as a child, and could be interchanged with them without 
discernible difference” (Taylor 1987, 298). Animals live their 
lives in “unchanging cycles,” “to be repeated over and over, 
forever.” Such a repetitive world, however, a world that goes 
nowhere, is not only a world without history, but also, precisely 
for this reason, a world without meaning. This is because in a 
world without history “nothing is ever created” (Taylor 1987, 
299), at least not in the way that would be required to make 
what someone creates meaningful. For that, the creative act 
must be freely chosen. Whatever someone creates “must be 
something of his own, the product of his own creative mind, of 
his own conception, something which, but for his own creative 
thought and imagination, would never have existed at all” (Tay-
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lor 1987, 300). This, Taylor insists, is a kind of creative activity 
that cannot be found in nature: it requires rational beings “who 
can think, imagine, plan, and execute things of worth”. Every-
thing that may strike us as an example of immense creativity in 
the non-human world, like “the complex beauty of the spider’s 
web” or “the ingenious construction of the honeycomb”, is in 
fact just another example of “endless repetitions,” a “capacity 
of fabrication,” which discloses “not the least hint of creative 
power” (Taylor 1987, 301). True creativity brings forth things 
that are genuinely new. Only humans have that kind of creativ-
ity, though not everyone has it in the same degree. According 
to Taylor, creative power has an “indescribable worth,” which 
is why it gives human existence its significance and meaning: 
“That a world should exist is not finally important, nor does 
it mean much, by itself, that people should inhabit it. But that 
some of these should, in varying degrees, be capable of creat-
ing worlds of their own and history – thereby creating time in 
its historical sense – is what gives our lives whatever meaning 
they have” (Taylor 2012, 303).
Does it, though? Taylor argues that without us, or without 
rational beings, time would not be (fully) real because there 
would not be any history, and that a world without history is 
a world in which nothing “new” happens. Such a world is de-
clared to be meaningless not because the past is not remem-
bered, but because the past is supposed to be more or less (that 
is, in all relevant respects) identical to the present, as the future 
will be identical to the present. Yet whether or not it is largely 
depends on what we choose to mean by “new.” In many ways 
there is undeniably newness even in a world without life. Con-
tinents form and fall apart, seas dry out, and flat surfaces fold 
into mountains. And there are even more changes, more new 
things happening, in a world populated by living, though not 
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rational, beings. Species come and go; old ones change, then 
disappear, new ones gradually enter the stage. And those new 
species could not have been predicted. None of those changes 
could have. So in what sense exactly is all that has happened 
in the world since its creation before the arrival of human be-
ings devoid of newness? Perhaps in the sense that even though 
this particular kind of animal never existed before, animals 
have, and this one is just more of the same. But we could say 
the same about human productions, even highly artistic and 
original ones. A new nocturne of Chopin’s (one of Taylor’s ex-
amples of true newness) is different from the previous ones, but 
it would still be a nocturne, and still be a musical composition. 
And even though Chopin might be different from other com-
posers, he is still a composer who basically does what other 
composers also do, namely compose stuff. It is not possible to 
draw a clear distinction between the genuinely or relevantly 
new and the ordinary and not really new.
Neither is the claim particularly convincing that every spar-
row is the same as every other, doing exactly what all other 
sparrows do and have done since the beginning of time (or the 
beginning of sparrows). To a casual observer this may indeed 
appear to be the case, but if you look more closely you will find 
that even sparrows are individuals and do not generally behave 
exactly like any other sparrow. And for each one of them, what 
they do is very new to them, as if it were in fact the first time 
that it is being done. (That is actually the advantage of having 
no history: an abundance of newness.) The problem with ca-
sual observers is that they are also lazy observers. Of course, 
all sparrows do what sparrows do. Although even whole spar-
row populations may occasionally learn new things when they 
adapt to a changing environment, they still live a sparrow life, 
and the general features of that life are well defined and fixed. 
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But the same is true for us. We are alike in many ways, and be-
have alike in many ways. Everything we do is confined by the 
human life form. We do what humans do and never go beyond 
that. In sum, there is more newness in a sparrow’s life and less 
newness in a human life than Taylor is willing to allow for.
What is the point of an animal’s life?
Still, if the life of a non-human animal does not really con-
nect with the things that we feel (rightly or wrongly) inclined to 
regard as objectively valuable, and if non-human animals have 
no understanding of their life as a whole and are incapable of 
consciously creating new worlds the way we can, then we may 
well wonder what the point is of their existence. What exactly 
are they good for? It has occasionally been suggested that the 
life of a non-human animal may acquire meaning by being put 
to an important use. Thus Viktor Frankl, in his holocaust mem-
oir Man’s Search for Meaning, when wondering whether there 
is any meaning to human suffering even though we may not be 
able to grasp it, proposes that the suffering of “an ape which 
was being used to develop poliomyelitis serum, and for this 
reason punctured again and again” (Frankl 1959, 121) would 
be meaningful, though not in a way that the ape would be able 
to understand. It would therefore be subjectively meaningless, 
but nonetheless objectively meaningful (like, perhaps, the life 
of a prisoner in a concentration camp). From this it would seem 
to follow that we could make the lives of non-human animals 
(more) meaningful by subjecting them to (if necessary painful 
and even deadly) experiments or other invasive practices that 
have the potential of resulting in some benefit for humanity, 
because then their lives would finally have a point, which oth-
erwise they do not.
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William James played with the same idea in his essay “Is 
Life Worth Living?”: “Consider a poor dog whom they are viv-
isecting in a laboratory. He lies strapped on a board and shriek-
ing at its executioners, and to his own dark consciousness is 
literally in a sort of hell. He cannot see a single redeeming ray 
in the whole business; and yet all these diabolical-seeming 
events are often controlled by human intentions with which, if 
his poor benighted mind could only be made to catch a glimpse 
of them, all that is heroic in him would religiously acquiesce. 
(…) Lying on his back on the board there he may be performing 
a function incalculably higher than any that prosperous canine 
life admits of” (James 1895, 58). To be fair, James loved dogs, 
but he was also a scientist of his time and as such believed 
that vivisection was often necessary to gain knowledge. So, 
he tried to convince himself that the suffering non-human ani-
mals were routinely subjected to was ultimately justified, that it 
was meaningful, hoping against hope and his better judgement. 
He struggled with the issue his whole life (Campbell 2015).
Yet contrary to what James suggests here, knowing that his 
suffering is all part of a big plan and will actually benefit hu-
manity is unlikely to provide much solace to the tortured dog. 
If that makes his life meaningful, it is not the kind of meaning 
that anyone, dog or human, would like their life to have, at least 
not primarily. It may be an added bonus or better than nothing, 
but in itself it is a long way from making a life worth living. To 
think that a non-human animal’s life would somehow be bet-
ter or more meaningful if it in some way improved our lives is 
more than anything else an expression of our human arrogance 
and sense of entitlement. Kurt Baier, in an early paper on the 
meaning of life (1957), misleadingly claims that we do not usu-
ally think that a thing is better for having a purpose. “A row 
of trees growing near a farm may or may not have a purpose: 
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it may or may not be a windbreak, may or may not have been 
planted or deliberately left standing there in order to prevent 
the wind from sweeping across the field. We do not in any way 
disparage the trees if we say they have no purpose, but have 
just grown that way. They are as beautiful, made of as good 
wood, as valuable, as if they had a purpose. And of course, they 
break the wind just as well.” The same, Baier claims, holds for 
animals: the sheep dog or watch dog is no better than the “dog 
that hangs around the house and is fed by us” (Baier 1957, 120).
This is, of course, only partly right. When it comes to ani-
mals and plants we do in fact tend to assign value to them in ac-
cordance with their perceived utility. Many people would prob-
ably value the sheep dog and the watch dog more highly than a 
dog that just hangs around the house (except when the latter is 
perceived to satisfy a strong emotional need), simply because 
they are perceived to be more useful. They are indeed better, 
namely for a certain (human) purpose. Similarly, a useful tree 
will be regarded more highly than a “useless” tree. Its useful-
ness makes it the better tree. However, even though it may not 
be true that a living being that serves a (human) purpose is 
not usually considered to be any better than one that serves no 
purpose, what we should be able to say with greater confidence 
is that a living being that has no purpose is in no way worse off 
than one that does, which means that life is just as much worth 
living for the no-purpose dog as it is for the sheep dog, watch 
dog, or companion dog. Baier does not see this because he is 
not much interested in non-human animals, which does not 
prevent him from making the following very keen observation: 
man, he says, “is in a different category, however. To attribute 
to a human being a purpose in that sense is not neutral, let 
alone complimentary: it is offensive. It is degrading for a man 
to be regarded as merely serving a purpose” (Baier 1957, 120). 
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This is a very important insight: having an assigned purpose 
would not enhance our worth in our own eyes; it would dimin-
ish it. Yet if that is so, if having such a purpose would actually 
degrade us, then this suggests that far from being a precondi-
tion of a meaningful (human or non-human) life, having an 
assigned purpose would actually make one’s life less meaning-
ful because it would then not be lived on its own terms, but on 
somebody else’s terms. Baier does not explicitly say this, but 
it is clearly implied. If my life has a purpose allotted to me by 
God or whoever, then my own purposes count for nothing or 
little. Yet it is these purposes that allow me to experience my 
life as meaningful. It follows that only if there is no meaning 
of my life, can there be meaning in my life. The same holds for 
non-human animals: if there is a purpose to their lives that we 
have chosen for them, then this does not make their lives more 
meaningful, but, on the contrary, less so, simply because there 
is less room for them to develop, explore and pursue their own 
purposes. To be truly meaningful, the purposes we have cannot 
lie outside of us. They must be our own purposes. Only if my 
life has no point, i.e., if it is not good for anything else, does the 
actual living of my life have a point. As a younger (and wiser) 
Richard Taylor put it: “The point of living is simply to be liv-
ing, in the manner that it is your nature to be living” (Taylor 
1970, 28).
Appreciating the meaningfulness of non-human 
lives
That the point of living is simply to be living does of course 
not mean that living is always meaningful. We may sometimes 
choose, or more likely be forced, to live in a way that is not 
our nature to be living, and then our living becomes pointless. 
Life can be meaningful only for beings that can experience the 
absence or loss of meaning. If an animal’s life could never be 
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meaningless, then it could not be meaningful either. But it can 
be meaningless because it can be felt to be meaningless, and it 
is felt to be meaningless when the one who lives it is prevented 
from living it the way it is their nature to live it. A paradig-
matic case is a large animal confined to a small space. Such an 
animal is apt to feel like Rainer Maria Rilke’s panther, locked 
in a cage in Paris’s Jardin des Plantes: “His gaze against the 
sweeping of the bars/ has grown so weary, it can hold no more./ 
To him, there seem to be a thousand bars/ and back behind 
those thousand bars no world.” (The translation is Stanley Ap-
pelbaum’s.) The life of Rilke’s panther has clearly lost its point. 
It has become meaningless (despite its possible entertainment 
value for the zoo’s visitors) and appears no longer worth liv-
ing. Yet unconfined and in its natural habitat, the panther’s 
life would be, unquestioningly, worth living. For the panther, 
it would be a rich life, full of meaning, full of reasons to live. 
The life that a non-human animal is naturally equipped to live 
always means something to them, perhaps more than ours to 
us. Animals suffer from depression only when they are held in 
captivity, while we manage to feel depressed by our life despite 
being free to live differently. Something is not quite right here. 
Leo Tolstoy, in his Confession, remarks that our lives are now 
meaningless because we have lost our way: we do not live our 
lives the way we ought to. Non-human animals generally do 
a much better job at living meaningful lives: “a bird is made 
in such a way that it can fly, gather food and build a nest, and 
when I see a bird doing these things I rejoice. Goats, hares and 
wolves are made in order to eat, multiply and feed their fami-
lies, and when they do this I feel quite sure that they are happy 
and that their lives are meaningful” (Tolstoy 1882, 68-9).
What exactly that meaning consists in we cannot always say 
because it is their world and not ours that generates it. We can-
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not fully understand it because it is so different from ours, but 
it is not so alien either that it cannot be approximated through 
careful and caring observation and life-sharing. Take for in-
stance the following description of a moment in the life of a 
hunting dog that Tolstoy gives his readers in Anna Karenina 
from the dog’s perspective: “Their smell struck her more and 
more strongly, more and more distinctly, and suddenly it be-
came perfectly clear to her that one of them was there, behind 
that hummock, five steps away from her. She stopped and her 
whole body froze. On her short legs she could see nothing 
ahead of her, but she knew from the smell that it was sitting no 
more than five steps away. She stood, sensing it more and more 
and delighting in the anticipation. Her tense tail was extended 
and only its very tip twitched. Her mouth was slightly open, her 
ears pricked up a little. One ear had got folded back as she ran, 
and she was breathing heavily but cautiously, and still more 
cautiously she turned more with her eyes than with her head to 
look at her master. He, with his usual face but with ever terrible 
eyes, was coming, stumbling over hummocks, and extremely 
slowly as it seemed to her” (Tolstoy 1878, 593).
When we judge the lives of non-human animals to be devoid 
of meaning or pointless and therefore ultimately not worth liv-
ing, we give expression not so much to the comparative poverty 
of their lives (being unconcerned by what is objectively worthy 
of being loved, incapable of transcending their animal nature, 
storyless, temporally challenged, and uncreative), but instead 
to our own humanist prejudices, the limitations of our imagina-
tion, and our unwillingness to empathically relate to the specif-
ic circumstances of their life. Non-human animals may have no 
access to the goods that we pursue, and even if they did would 
probably lack the comprehension to see any point in pursuing 
them. They cannot understand why we do the things we do and 
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what they mean to us. However, we do not have any access to 
the goods they pursue either. The very fact that we do not see 
much point in doing what they do shows clearly enough there 
is something here that we are missing. Generally speaking, if 
there is something we do not see, the reason may be that what 
we don’t see is not there, or alternatively we may simply be 
blind to it. Accordingly, if the lives of non-human animals ap-
pear meaningless to us and not worth living, then this is either 
because they are indeed meaningless and not worth living or 
because we fail to recognize and appreciate what makes them 
meaningful. Given that animals, under normal circumstances, 
give no indication whatsoever that they find their life not worth 
living, the latter is far more likely. “Take our dogs and our-
selves,” writes William James in his seminal essay “On a Cer-
tain Blindness in Human Beings,” “connected as we are by a 
tie more intimate than most ties in this world; and yet, outside 
of that tie of friendly fondness, how insensible, each of us, to 
all that makes life significant for the other! – we to the rapture 
of bones under hedges, or smells of trees and lamp-posts, they 
to the delights of literature and art. As you sit reading the most 
moving romance you ever fell upon, what sort of a judge is your 
fox-terrier of your behavior? With all his good will toward you, 
the nature of your conduct is absolutely excluded from his com-
prehension. To sit there like a senseless statue, when you might 
be taking him to walk and throwing sticks for him to catch!” 
(James 1899, 267).
If dogs could philosophize about meaning in life, they would 
probably come to the conclusion that the life of a human is of 
little value and, all things considered, not really worth living 
at all. Who, after all, would want to spend a large part of their 
life sitting on a chair gazing intently at a computer screen and 
tapping away with their fingers on a board? Instead of wilfully 
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ignoring the possibility that a life that is very different from 
ours can possibly be meaningful, we should follow James’s 
advice that “where-ever there is conflict of opinion and dif-
ference of vision, we are bound to believe that the truer side is 
the side that feels the more, and not the side that feels the less” 
(James, 268). This also means that we should not pronounce 
on the “meaninglessness of forms of existence other than our 
own; and it commands us to tolerate, respect, and indulge those 
whom we see harmlessly interested and happy in their own 
ways, however unintelligible these may be to us. Hands off; 
neither the whole of truth nor the whole of good is revealed to 
any single observer” (James, 264).
It is a rather regrettable fact of our modern lives that we 
are often blind to the “fundamental static goods of life,” to the 
good “of seeing, smelling, tasting, sleeping, and daring and do-
ing with one’s body” (James, 258) and the “intense interest that 
life can assume when brought down to the non-thinking level, 
the level of pure sensorial perception” (James, 259). Contempo-
rary philosophers have a tendency to see the notion of a mean-
ingful life as reserved for the few—those who make a lasting 
impact, those who change the world. Even those who acknowl-
edge that non-human animals can have meaningful lives tend 
to use examples that strongly suggest that it is the exception 
rather than the rule for non-human animals to live meaning-
ful lives and that meaning results primarily if not exclusively 
from extraordinary accomplishments, especially in the service 
of humanity or at least some fraction of humanity. Thus Joshua 
Thomas uses as his prime examples for animals that lived a 
meaningful life Smoky the dog, who “was found abandoned in 
a foxhole in the New Guinea jungle during World War II, and 
accompanied Corporal William Wynne through twelve combat 
missions over two years, earning eight battle stars and surviv-
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ing 150 air raids and even a typhoon,” and the space dog Laika, 
who “started off life as a stray dog on the streets of Moscow but 
who was picked up by the Soviet Space Programme, underwent 
specialist cosmonaut training, and eventually became the first 
animal ever to orbit the earth” (2018, 266). When we focus on 
such animals we make the same mistake as when we associate 
meaning in life primarily with people like Mother Teresa, Nel-
son Mandela, Vincent van Gogh, or Albert Einstein. The no-
tion of a meaningful life needs to be democratised. Meaningful 
lives are not the exception; they are the rule. We do not start 
from a position of meaninglessness and then acquire meaning 
only if we are particularly gifted, lucky, and hard-working. The 
default mode of existence is a life steeped in meaningfulness. 
What we should be concerned about is not how to give mean-
ing to our lives, but how not to lose it. 
Conclusion
Craig was not right about dogs. To the extent that people can 
live meaningful lives, lives that matter, have a point, and are 
worth living, non-human animals can too. Perhaps their lives 
do not matter in the grand scheme of things. Perhaps they do 
not lead anywhere. But if they do not, then our human lives, for 
all we know, do not really lead anywhere either, not in the long 
run. We have no idea what if anything is “objectively valuable.” 
We have no idea whether there is any cosmic purpose to our 
lives that we fail to grasp, and even if there were, it would be of 
little use to us. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, 
we can only assume that our life is meaningful to the extent 
that it is felt to be so, and there are myriad ways in which life 
can be felt to be meaningful, depending on who and what we 
are. “Wherever a process of life communicates an eagerness to 
him who lives it, there the life becomes genuinely significant. 
Sometimes the eagerness is more knit up with the motor ac-
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tivities, sometimes with the perceptions, sometimes with the 
imagination, sometimes with reflective thought. But, wherever 
it is found, there is the zest, the tingle, the excitement of reality; 
and there is “importance” in the only real and positive sense in 
which importance ever anywhere can be” (James 1899, 269).
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